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Chapter 2
Looking Backward, Looking Forward:
Where is Pension Policy Headed?
James A. Klein

An inescapable element of the retirement paradigm is the public policy
environment within which pension laws and regulations are developed.
Issues of plan design, investment choices, and financing are matters
that are principally determined by plan sponsors and participants with
the help of service providers and other experts. Yet all of these decisions
are made against the backdrop of a retirement system that is in large part
structured according to rules that were either established or reaffirmed by
the key pension law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 1974, and by amendments to that law enacted over the past
thirty years.
In the future, the retirement paradigm will be reinvented because
people and entities directly engaged in designing and sponsoring plans,
as well as those benefiting from plans, will make countless decisions
about their immediate and long-term needs. They will adjust retirement
plan programs, and retirement practices themselves, to accommodate
those needs. Depending on how much thought is put into the development
of the new paradigm, the pension institution may be refashioned in a
logical and orderly way, or reinvented piece by piece. But, either way,
to effectuate many of the changes that will lead to a new retirement
paradigm will inevitably require public policy changes. In the best case
scenario, the public policy arena will actually facilitate the development of
the new paradigm. But if we are not so fortunate, the public policy arena
will be the black hole into which thoughtful ideas plunge, never to emerge
again. Because the public policy dimensions will be so crucial to the
reinvention of a new retirement paradigm, this chapter identifies four
elements that may help in the development of a paradigm suitable for
the next thirty years. These are the key role of trust in a regulatory scheme;
the importance of balancing objectives in pension policy; the key importance of recognizing expectations; and the need for retirement policy
champions.
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The Key Role of Trust
Government officials and private sector representatives from many countries have sought to learn about the US pension system as they wrestle with
the development of private sector individual and employer-sponsored retirement systems in their own countries. It seems clear that, whatever else
they might accept or reject from our system as they develop their own, they
should give thoughtful consideration to the concepts enshrined in Title I
of ERISA dealing with fiduciary responsibilities. This is because much of
the success of the US retirement system relies on the fact that workers and
employers are willing to turn over large sums of money to one or more
third parties, believing that this money will be responsibly managed and
prudently invested, and it will be used to pay retirees benefits many decades
into the future.
Commensurate with this trust is the confidence that if, by chance, the
people and entities to whom these funds are entrusted should act in a
negligent or dishonest fashion, then an enforcement system will hold them
to account. Such faith in the system is not based on a naı̈ve confidence in
the goodness of others; rather, it is based upon a belief in the essential
soundness of the structure set forth in ERISA. That this system is largely
self-policing is an even more remarkable tribute to how well it works most
of the time. It is not merely a linguistic coincidence that the vehicle into
which pension assets are placed is called a ‘trust’.
The US pension system is, of course, far from perfect. But the unfortunate instances of neglect or abuse regarding private retirement plans that
are identified (and punished) are attributable more to the misfeasance of a
few, rather than due to fundamental shortcomings in the legal framework
of the entire pension system. What is unclear, of course, is what percentage
of those who act in a negligent or abusive manner are identified under the
current regulatory and enforcement regime. Thus it is with some trepidation that I call for greater trust between the regulators and the regulated
community when redesigning the pension regulatory structure.
Pension practitioners have long decried the growing complexity of pension law in the aftermath of ERISA. Perhaps those of us with little or no
experience in other policy arenas (e.g. environmental and housing) may
overstate the complexity of pension policy relative to other areas of the law.
Even so, in a voluntary retirement system, the concerns of those who must
be relied upon to establish and maintain plans cannot be lightly dismissed.
Whatever the truth might be (and ‘complexity’ itself is a rather subjective
condition), the fact that the rules governing the pension system are often
difficult to understand and expensive to implement seems to be a point
conceded even by those who believe that the rules are warranted.
In some respects, the complex regulatory scheme in place today is a byproduct of the breakdown in trust between the government and the plan
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sponsor community. This was perhaps most clearly evidenced in the reformulation of pension nondiscrimination rules in 1986, when a looser ‘facts
and circumstances’ standard was changed to more precise mechanical rules.
On one hand, the rejection of the ‘facts and circumstances’ approach was a
response to complaints from plan sponsors themselves, who felt that the
interpretation and enforcement of those standards were inconsistent and
arbitrary (Gale et al. 1999). Plan sponsors had lost faith in the regulators. On
the other hand, the movement toward a more rigid standard was also a
manifestation of regulators unease as to whether plan sponsors were designing their plans in a way that was fair to participants at different income levels.
Yet it would be an oversimplification to attribute much of the highly
regulated nature of the pension system to a breakdown in trust between the
‘regulators’ and the ‘regulated’. The late Michael Gordon (1999), one of
the fathers of ERISA, summed up the essential paradox of ERISA when he
wrote about the law’s ‘mandatory imposition of substantial regulatory
standards on a totally voluntary system’. The fact that many employers
who are not required to sponsor a plan continue to do so, despite costly
and complex regulatory requirements, is a testament to the underlying
strength of the system and the belief of plan sponsors that retirement plans
are important, despite the difficulty of maintaining them. Yet, to the extent
that the regulatory burden is cited by employers as a reason not to sponsor
a plan, the challenge for the future is to forge a system in which the
regulatory requirements do not undermine the willingness of plan sponsors to initiate or continue a plan.
Another dimension of the regulatory scheme that governs the pension
system involves the substantial notice and reporting requirements that
accompany the sponsorship of a private sector retirement plan. To the
extent that these responsibilities require plan sponsors to report information to participants, the enduring challenge is to make sure that the
information conveyed is relevant and understandable. When reporting
requirements are based on the government’s need to receive information
in order to ensure compliance with the law, the regulated community
should accept some burden as the application of the Reagan Doctrine of
nuclear disarmament (‘trust but verify’) to the pension system. The problem is that if the new retirement paradigm is still to be based on the
premise of a voluntary system, Congress and government agencies responsible for developing complex rules and for requiring the reporting of
voluminous information must ensure that the regulatory burden satisfies
a cost-benefit analysis at least in some rough sense. Future regulators must
demonstrate more clearly than in the past that the information required,
and the complex testing to which plans must be subjected is, in fact,
necessary to achieve some greater objective.
How might this be accomplished? At the margin, legislative and regulatory relief could be enacted to strip away some of the more obvious forms of
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regulatory overkill that have developed as successive Congresses and agencies have developed new rules. Indeed in the last few years, Congressional
action has simplified the operations of the pension system. But meaningful
progress toward a new regulatory framework based on concepts of fairness
and equity will require a different mindset between the regulated community and the regulators, one where the essential ingredient is the restoration of trust between plan sponsors and regulators.
From the regulators’ perspective, this greater trust may need to take the
form of looser rules that afford plan sponsors more flexibility in the
operation of plans, with fewer precise hurdles that must be cleared. From
the plan sponsors’ perspective, this trust might be manifested in a willingness to accept even harsher penalties for failure to meet more flexible
standards that would be established. In other words, the regulated community could be accorded more trust that they are designing and operating
plans for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries within a broader
framework of the enunciated public policy. In return, regulators would
be accorded more trust that they will enforce the law consistently and fairly
within that more flexible framework; and they would also be empowered to
impose even greater sanctions, in instances when the actions taken are
clearly inconsistent with the retirement security objectives of the underlying rule (e.g. abuse cases).
This trade-off would represent a fairly substantial gamble on the part of
both the regulated community and the regulators, yet there is reason for
optimism. In recent years, both the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the
US Department of Labor have initiated programs in which pension plan
sponsors are accorded more protections from sanctions for various violations if they come forward voluntarily to disclose the violation.1
One confidence-building measure to spur a more desirable regulatory
structure would be to engage parties with a legitimate stake in the outcome
of regulations more fully with one another during the development of
regulations. Since ERISA’s enactment, most retirement policy rulemaking
has involved the agencies’ inviting the input of parties with an interest
in the rules to provide written comments, to testify at public hearings
and to meet directly with regulators to discuss concerns. The level of
communication between the regulators and interested parties is excellent, yet the many segments of the retirement system with disparate interests rarely engage in simultaneous discussions with one another and the
regulators.2

The Importance of Balancing Objectives
The tax and labor aspects of pension policy have not always been in balance
over the past three decades. As a result, there is currently no consistent
legislative and regulatory regime, nor is there a coherent retirement
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income policy. On the one hand, regulatory agencies with enforcement
responsibilities over the pension system have well-defined roles and have
avoided directly conflicting activities since the adoption of Reorganization
Plan No. 4 in 1978 [543 Fed. Reg. 47713, Oct. 17, 1978]. On the other hand,
it is probably fair to say that the Congressional committees with oversight of
pension law have been less consistent than the regulatory agencies about
staying within the purview of their own jurisdiction.
For instance, the numerous parallel provisions of pension law enshrined
in ERISA and in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), resulted, in part, from
the lack of trust between Congressional tax and labor committee members
when the pension law was crafted in 1974. Each committee wanted to
protect its turf and ensure ongoing oversight authority. This dual regulatory structure may be a necessary outgrowth of the fact that pension policy
is and must be an amalgam of labor and tax policy. That said, were there
more collaboration between and among the Congressional committees of
jurisdiction and—to a lesser extent—the executive branch agencies
with jurisdiction over the nation’s retirement system, the oversight of the
pension system today would be a great deal simpler and more consistent.
Some observers have suggested that the dual jurisdiction of the US
Department of Labor and the US Department of Treasury/Internal Revenue Service could be merged into a single federal department with
retirement system oversight. In support of this idea, critics emphasize
conflict between the US Treasury Department’s mission of raising tax
revenue, and the retirement system’s goal of promoting saving (Siciliano
2004). The idea of a unified federal agency certainly bears thoughtful
consideration, but it is possible to achieve greater retirement system cohesion without going that far.
The principal impetus for ERISA was the need to protect pension rights,
so fiduciary concerns were a strong motivating force for its enactment.
Despite its origins, however, in the intervening years, tax policy has driven
the principal changes in the pension system, resulting in increasing conflict
between tax and labor aspects of pension policy. From the Revenue Act of
1978 through the Economic Growth and Tax Reform and Relief Act
of 2001, there were more than twenty pieces of major legislation that
changed pension law, typically through changes in the tax code (even
where parallel ERISA provisions were also adopted). This dominance of
tax over labor aspects in pension policy is not absolute, of course. For
example, attention has been devoted to participants’ diversification rights
and fiduciary responsibilities in the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom
problems. On the other hand, the larger conflict in pension policy over
much of the past thirty years has not been the schism between ‘tax’ and
‘labor’ policy but, rather, has been the tension between tax legislation
enacted primarily for revenue raising purposes, and tax legislation enacted
for retirement income security purposes.
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This point was made clearly during the 1980s and early 1990s, when
much pension law was enacted in an effort to address substantial federal
budget deficits rather than driven by the need to boost saving. Moreover,
much of the legislation designed to curtail the federal tax revenue loss
attributable to tax-qualified pension contributions3 was enacted intermittently between other bills designed to shore up the funded status of pension
plans.4 This somewhat schizophrenic pattern exposed the absence of any
coherent retirement income policy, and it also made evident the conflict
between tax policy limiting lost tax revenue and tax policy protecting
pension benefits. These problems were mitigated somewhat in the mid to
late 1990s as the transformation of budget deficits into surpluses eased
efforts to enact nearly annual tax measures curtailing tax expenditures
accorded to pensions. In addition, the stronger economy until 1999 produced better funded plans and less need to legislate improvements in
funding standards.
It would be unfair to attribute the revenue loss versus retirement security
conflict in the pension system entirely to the regulatory environment.
Some have observed that, among plan sponsors themselves, the various
corporate functions which direct pension policy have not always worked in
harmony. The corporate model has been compared to that of a car in
which (a) the head of human resources is the driver, with a foot pressing
the accelerator in the hope of providing progressive and generous benefits
to workers and retirees; (b) the chief financial officer is a concerned
passenger in the front seat leaning over and trying to apply the brakes
and control costs; and (c) the company actuary is sitting in the back seat,
looking out the rear window giving the other two directions. In recent
years, the finance concerns of plan sponsors have often taken a ‘front seat’
role in the determination of companies’ pension decisions, as witness some
firms freezing pension accruals in light of the long-term uncertainty about
the interest rate that will be required for calculating defined benefit (DB)
plan liabilities.
While it would be imprudent of Congress and policymakers to dismiss
the cost implications of the pension system and proposed retirement
policy, many run the risk of understanding the cost of pensions much better
than they understand their value. This is in part the result of extensive
government focus on the tax revenue loss implications of pensions, with
the annual publication of pension tax expenditure and calculations of
federal revenue estimates by the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation. Any serious effort to reinvent the pension paradigm will require
much more concerted attention to questions that have been all but ignored
to date. These are issues such as proper balancing of interests between the
major stakeholders in the retirement system—individuals, employers, and
the government; better definition of the adequacy of retirement; and
benefits and drawbacks of different types of retirement vehicles.
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The current economic environment and the resurgence of federal
budget deficits may once again threaten the tax-favored treatment of
employer-sponsored retirement plans. But if the tax expenditure accorded
to pensions—the second biggest expenditure in the federal budget5—has
been responsible for frequent Congressional efforts to reduce revenue loss
through changes in retirement plans over the past thirty years, that dynamic is very likely to change over the next thirty years. For the entire
period of time since ERISA’s passage, the baby boomer generation has
been in the workforce; the tax qualified contributions made to the retirement plans of this sizable segment of the population have dwarfed the
taxable retirement benefits paid out to the smaller generation that preceded the boomers. Thus, the tax exclusion for contributions to retirement
plans has exceeded the taxes collected on retirement benefits, resulting in
the large expenditures. But as the boomers now begin to receive retirement
benefits and pay taxes on them, these trends might reverse, and the tax
structure accorded to the private retirement system may become a revenue
raiser. Regardless of whether that occurs, the challenge for retirement
policy in the next several years—in periods of surplus or deficit—will be
largely the same: to resist formulating policy based on the revenue implications alone, but rather on the basis of what will be required to ensure
retirement income security for an aging population. Clearly, the task will be
made much more difficult if large deficits persist, but greater difficulty
should not be permitted to interfere with the fundamental necessity of
the task.
This effort will require that Congressional tax-writing committees will
work in concert with the labor committees, with whom they share an
interest in retirement income security. This will not be easy, as it will
require collaboration over corresponding changes in both ERISA and
IRC provisions. This represents a golden opportunity that public policy
makers will have to address the really important questions about the future
of the retirement system and retirement security.

The Relevance of Expectations
The pension system has not lacked for controversy over the course of the
past several years, so it would be unrealistic to think that the future will be
free of controversy or debate over the nature of the pension promise. But a
new better-functioning retirement paradigm can be one in which constituencies with different perspectives and agendas make a more concerted
effort to appreciate each other’s expectations.
The current debate over hybrid pension plans represents a good example of where the retirement policy environment would benefit from
more recognition of others’ expectations. In large measure, the controversy over transitions from traditional DB to hybrid plans erupted over the
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issue of whether future benefit accruals could change: that is, whether the
employer could modify the benefit that workers expected that they would
receive if they continued to work and the plan remained unchanged. For
critics of hybrid plans, the answer was an emphatic ‘no’, while hybrid plan
advocates maintained that the law protects pension rights earned up until a
certain point, but it provides no guarantee of future benefit accrual.
Without delving into the details, it is plain to see that on one level, at
least, the dispute is one of ‘expectations’. Workers have expectations that
certain conditions and events will transpire (e.g. their continued employment and the continuation of their company’s pension plan). Correspondingly, plan sponsors have an expectation that they will continue to have the
flexibility to change the design of their plan without being legally bound to
pay benefits beyond those accrued.
It may be that these two competing expectations cannot be reconciled
and will, instead, have to be resolved in the courts or in the public policy
arena. Indisputably, however, the public discourse over such fundamental
questions would be far more civil and productive if each side of the debate
began by recognizing the other side’s legitimate and competing expectations. It is possible, for example, that a hybrid plan advocate would insist
that in a vibrant voluntary pension system, plan sponsors must have absolute flexibility to change their plans prospectively; while at the same time
they may still acknowledge that such flexibility could be contrary to plan
participants’ expectations. Similarly, a hybrid plan critic would advocate
that continuing certain pension plan features is more important than plan
sponsor flexibility; while at the same time, they might acknowledge the
harm that will be done to plan sponsors, or other participants, if employers
are denied that flexibility. In practice, however, debates over the key
pension questions are rarely posited to acknowledge the legitimacy of the
other side’s view. It is never done in a litigation context, and it seldom
occurs during the course of legislative or regulatory debate.
This hybrid plan example is merely illustrative of the broader problem
that plagues the retirement system debate. Of even greater concern than
the resolution of any single individual policy issue is the need to make
meaningful progress toward the reinvented retirement paradigm. Without
a more honest recognition of others’ reasonable perspectives, the nation is
unlikely to make much progress on difficult retirement policy questions
nor achieve the appropriate balancing of interests among participants,
plan sponsors, the government, and other pension stakeholders.
To successfully implement this proposal, each of the competing interests
in the retirement system debate will need to develop confidence that they
can publicly acknowledge the legitimate views of others without concern
that that recognition will be portrayed as a lessening in the advocacy of
their position. What can be done to overcome the mistrust that often
interferes with the willingness of competing interests in the retirement
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system to acknowledge the viewpoints and expectations of others? Initial
confidence-building measures might include efforts by the media to portray in a balanced fashion competing interests involved in a variety of
pension decisions. In addition, perhaps all advocacy groups could be
asked, when making the case for their own agenda, to acknowledge
where their own positions may be perceived as contrary to the interests of
others. For example, all negotiating sessions could begin not only with a list
of demands from each side, but also a rendition of each side’s understanding of the other side’s concerns and objectives. These measures are worth
trying as a means of breaking long-standing logjams and thinking creatively
about a new retirement policy paradigm.

The Need for Retirement Policy Champions
Virtually every history of ERISA portrays in glowing terms the statesmanship of a cadre of strong legislative leaders from both political parties.6
These lawmakers possessed the vision about the need for a comprehensive
law to regulate the pension system, and they also diligently immersed
themselves in the minutiae of the statutory provisions needed to bring to
fruition what ultimately became ERISA.
It is unfortunate that the last thirty years have produced only a handful of
members of Congress who could genuinely be called legislative champions
of the pension system. This is despite the prominent role that pensions play
in our economy, and despite the fact that retirement security is frequently a
rallying cry in congressional and presidential campaigns. Only very recently
have a few members of Congress moved to lay claims to this moniker.
Perhaps this change is a reflection of the aging of the workforce and the
growing awareness of the need to address the demographic realities that
will make retirement policy an even more prominent issue on the domestic
policy agenda.
Nonetheless, the paucity of pension champions may be due to the
extraordinary complexity of pension law and the difficulty of mastering
what has obviously become very detailed subject matter. It may also be due
to the fact that for about half of the past thirty years, Congress has struggled
with substantial budget deficits. Consequently, most pension legislative
activity emerged from efforts to curtail the pension tax expenditure in
order to either reduce federal budget deficits or help pay for cuts in
other more visible types of taxes, or both.
Whatever the reasons for the past dearth of pension legislative champions, it is difficult to imagine how positive pension policy in the future will
emerge unless more members of Congress make pension issues a personal
priority. There are simply too many natural obstacles to thwart forward
motion on retirement policy development—tax revenue implications, jurisdictional battles between and among committees with authority over
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pension policy, the difficulty of mastering intricate details of pension law,
and the political reality that the benefit of some pension changes are not
felt, and therefore cannot be confirmed, until many years into the future.
The success of prudent pension policy is often measured not in the positive
conditions that it creates but, rather, in negative conditions that it prevents
from occurring.
A shortage of pension legislative champions has resulted in at least two
significant casualties. At the micro level, there is a lack of consistency
among many of the statutes approved by Congress. At a macro level, it
has resulted in the absence of a coherent national retirement income
policy. The value of having retirement laws that are consistent with one
another is self-evident. The arguments in favor and opposed to developing
a national retirement income policy are much more complex and
nuanced—and developing such a policy would be much more difficult to
achieve even if there were widespread agreement that it should be done.
The challenge, therefore, is for those interested in a robust retirement
system to engage in a dialogue with thoughtful members of Congress, of
both parties and in both houses. Convincing lawmakers to do so should be
a somewhat easier task in the years ahead than it has been in the past,
because the demographic realities of an aging population and the growing
emphasis on retirement policy issues in the media means that pension
policy issues are much more important to the public discourse and, therefore, to elected officials.
To cultivate a larger group of retirement policy champions who will be
effective, regardless of the particular agenda that they may wish to advocate, it also will be necessary to persuade more future political leaders that
it is worth their while. They will have to learn the intricacies of pension
policy sufficiently well that they can earn the respect of their colleagues
who will not be retirement policy leaders, but who will rely upon the
leaders’ judgment in making some extraordinarily difficult decisions. It is
a tall order, but it is necessary to reinvent the retirement paradigm.

Endnotes
1. Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System, Revenue Procedure 2003–44;
Voluntary Fiduciary Correction Program, RIN 1210-AA76, March 28, 2002.
2. USC Sections 561–570. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act authorizes and encourages a process wherein, in real time, the disparate views of multiple interested
parties and the regulators can be discussed. Apart from some Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation rulemaking, however, the negotiated rulemaking process
has been rarely employed in the development of pension regulations. It might be
tried more frequently by the US Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue
Service to see whether it leads to an improved pension regulatory framework. At
a minimum, it might lead to a regulatory system in which interested parties more
fully understand and accept the outcome of the rulemaking process. This
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3.

4.

5.
6.

James A. Klein
approach, by itself, would not represent the reinvention of a retirement regulatory paradigm. But it could offer one possible tool for building it.
These include the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA ’86), and
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA ’93).
These include the Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986
(SEPPAA), Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA ’87), and the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990.
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2004 –2008, Joint Committee on Taxation, December 22, 2003.
See for instance Sass (1997).
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